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 Sappho's influence on the poetry of Hilda Doolittle, alias H.D., 
has received much critical attention,1 and various scholarly works 
on this topic have shed light on such themes as H.D.'s indebtedness 
to Hellenism, the function of Sapphistry in her work, as well 
as its bisexual poetics, among others.2  Largely characterized as 
modernist“refabrications”3 or“expansions,”4  H.D.'s translation 
of Sappho's fragments has garnered little examination as an 
actual work of translation, but precisely because it operates at 
the extremity of licentiousness,5 H.D.'s translation reveals much 
more about the nature of translation than is commonly assumed. 
Under the assumed continuity of a unitary Western literature 
that spans from classical Greek to modern English, such as is 
envisioned by the likes of T. S. Eliot, Sappho fits in neatly as H.D.'s 
lyrical predecessor; the Hellenistic and Sapphistric connections are 
intuitive enough.  But one must also not elide the inherent problem 
in any translation of Sappho:  namely, her work survives only in 
fragments, and many of her lines still remain lost.  Remarkably, 
the lyrics of Sappho that H.D. chooses to translate—Fragments 
113, 36, 40, 41, and 68—are perhaps the most fragmentary of the 
fragments.  Furthermore, even when the fragments retain a 
relatively larger number of lines intact, H.D. tends to fragment 
them into smaller pieces by excising the original with ellipses 
and then extrapolates or extends those small pieces, prompting 
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the aforementioned critical characterizations of her translation as 
creative refurbishings rather than genuine translations.  In a sense, 
the problem of translating Sappho is similar to the one Jonathan 
Abel describes in his essay on The Tales of Genji; just like the 
case of The Tales of Genji, translations of Sappho too “disallow 
presumptions about translation that posits the translated as 
superior, sacred, and original” despite many translators' claims of 
their intent to recapture the “original.”6  Translation has long been 
discussed in terms of loss—as Emily Apter states, it is one of the 
“primal truisms of translation” that “something is always lost in 
translation,”7 whereby the act of translation becomes synonymous 
with an act of compensation that is bound to fall short of the 
original—and Sappho literalizes this figurative loss that translation 
entails:  her fragments represent the consummate absence of the 
very original that the translation is supposed to redeem.  Given 
this literalized loss of the original, H.D.'s translation of Sappho 
effectively calls into question the conventional understanding of 
translation as a compensatory mechanism in which the translation 
somehow “makes up” for the illegibility of the original work; 
instead, it proposes a conception of translation as a creation—
a creation of loss that gives birth to the original through 
signification of its privation, or a creation of “afterlife” that creates 
the life past.8
 This “afterlife” expresses itself throughout H.D.'s translation 
of the Sappho fragments.  One of the recurring themes in H.D.'s 
Sappho fragments translations is the impulse to create a state of 
loss as a method of holding off the totalizing absence:  the poems 
forge the fiction of loss, rather than resigning themselves to a 
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state of nothingness, as though to suggest that, if we could make 
a claim that we had “lost” something, that object could plausibly 
be imagined to have existed in the past.9  This theme of the 
desire to inscribe a loss is the most immediately visible element in 
Fragment 113, which starts with an epigraph, “Neither honey nor 
bee for me”:
  Not honey,
  not the plunder of the bee
  from meadow or sand-flower
  or mountain bush;
  from winter-flower or shoot
  born of the later heat:
  not honey, not the sweet
  stain on the lips and teeth:
  not honey, not the deep
  plunge of soft belly
  and the clinging of the gold-edged
  pollen-dusted feet…10　　　　　　　　　　　　　(1-12)
Because of the placement of the word of negation, “not,” either at 
the beginning of the line or right after the caesura, the word gains 
a strong stress throughout the poem, given the metrical property 
of the line break or line breakage, such as caesurae, that often act 
as a weak-stressed syllable to be followed by a strong stress.  In 
other words, the poem underscores through its syntax the theme 
of negation and privation.  In fact, the word “not” is the one 
constancy that keeps haunting the poem; the objects of negation—
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honey, the bee, the sweet stain on the lips and teeth, the deep 
plunge of soft belly, the clinging of the feet, all merely enumerated 
and catalogued by a conjunctive word “or,” which equalizes them 
and makes them, in effect, indistinguishable from one another—
keep shifting, blurring into one another and passing through the 
scenery like a phantasmagoria.
 This sense of loss is inherent in the very fragment on 
which this translation is based, due to the circumstances of the 
fragment's survival; reportedly, only the epigraph “Neither honey 
nor bee for me” is all that has survived of the poem, and only in 
quotations by later authors, since its “main body… was burned by 
the medieval church.”11  This translation, in a sense, issues forth 
from the practical void of the original, and even the germ of its 
original, the epigraph, survived in the works of other authors as 
a quotation, like a transplanted organ inside someone else's body. 
If, through miracles of stem-cell research and science fiction, we 
were to have a way of reconstructing a whole person from his or 
her sole surviving organ inside someone else's body, the newly 
constructed person would not, by all means, be the same individual 
as the deceased who left that organ; he or she will have a mind of 
his or her own and, despite some likely resemblance of appearance, 
will be a completely different person:  a new person.  Similarly—
since translations of historical nature “emerge from a past no 
longer directly accessible, and at the same time reach toward a 
future where a cultural survival is sought”12 —a translation that 
issues from the death of the original is neither a reconstruction 
nor a recapitulation of the original but instead a construction, a 
creation.
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 This sense of a created something, of a presence in the midst 
of all the losses and absences—similar to that of the Cartesian 
cogito after all things are stripped down and negated, a sense that 
“body, shape, extension, movement, and place are all chimeras” and 
that “nothing is certain”13 —is what the closing stanza of Fragment 
113 captures:
  not iris—old desire—old passion—
  old forgetfulness—old pain—
  not this, nor any flower,
  but if you turn again,
  seek strength of arm and throat,
  touch as the god;
  neglect the lyre-note;
  knowing that you shall feel,
  about the frame
  no trembling of the string
  but heat, more passionate
  of bone and the white shell
  and fiery tempered steel.　　　　　　　(131-132: 31-43)
After the negation of all things in the preceding lines, the last three 
lines confirm a presence through a kind of double negative syntax 
of “not… but….”  The first two lines of the stanza compartmentalize 
each of the “old” elements—desire, passion, forgetfulness, pain—in 
isolation inside dashes, effectively putting them to death through 
disconnection from all meaningful matters.  Although the rest of 
the stanza too consists of sentence fragments, they are supplied 
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with a number of grammatical markers that indicate a sustained 
syntax—such as conjunctions like “but” and subordinations like 
“if”—and their integration into the system of meaning, as well 
as their interconnection between one another.  Through the death 
of the old and through the reconstruction of senses, the one thing 
that the speaker insists “you” will feel, the one ascertainable thing 
amidst all the other chimerical matters that are negated, is the 
“heat”—the essential kind that is like a bone, a kind of fire that 
tempers and gives birth to steel.  From this ending, one gleans 
a sense of steadfastness, of certain loyalty:  an unwavering core 
stripped of all inessentials.
 The language of loyalty in this poem is that of marriage; in 
fact, Sappho's fragment 113 is compiled in the “Epithalamia, Bridal 
Songs” section in Wharton's text, which is the text H.D. used 
herself.  Wharton's text annotates that the fragment is a “wish for 
good unmixed with evil” usually by the bride:  an expression of 
faithfulness.14  Fragment 113 has been conventionally interpreted 
as a love poem, which is hardly a surprise; as Charles Martindale 
states, “our current interpretations of ancient texts, whether or not 
we are aware of it, are, in complex ways, constructed by the chain 
of receptions through which their continued readability has been 
effected,”15 and this “chain of receptions” as regards to Sappho 
is that she “has been traditionally seen as the consummate poet 
of eros, specifically, of eros crisis,”16 as evident in Swinburne's 
characterization of her as “Love's priestess, mad with pain and joy 
of song, / Song's priestess, mad with joy and pain of love.”17  H.D.'s 
refabrication or expansion of Sappho's fragment 113 is, therefore, 
in keeping with the conventional interpretations and translations 
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of Sappho:  an unwavering, faithful love.
 Regardless of whether H.D. is conscious of it or not—and one 
should always be judicious in deducing any authorial knowledge 
or intent—the language of love and marriage is, and has been, a 
metonym for the language of translation:  that is, in translation 
theory, we commonly assess translations in terms of their “fidelity”—
a word with a strong marital connotation—and “license”—also a 
word with a less but still unmistakable overtone of extramarital 
sexuality, as in its variant, “licentious.”  Furthermore, it almost 
goes without saying that the language of love and the language 
of poesy have always been interconnected through conflation. 
Whether or not H.D. intended this effect can be debated, likely 
without any firm resolution, but nonetheless, this marital language 
opens up a possibility for a reading of Fragment 113 as a kind of a 
statement about translation.  Just like the unwavering core of love 
stripped of all inessentials, H.D.'s translation is an attempt to strip 
of all inessentials and to pare Sappho's fragment down to its very 
essence, to which her translation will be faithful like the fire that 
tempers the steel.  H.D.'s Fragment 113 expresses a fiery, steely 
kind of devotion to the effort to find the object of faith, analogous 
to Descartes' stringent self-negation that uncovers the undeniable 
core of oneself.
 The real question in translation theory, of course, is:  what is 
it in the original that a translator is being, or trying to be, faithful 
to?  For sometime, the question of “fidelity” was a discussion 
between the word-for-word approach and sense-for-sense approach, 
but with the discovery of Walter Benjamin in the latter half of 
the twentieth century, we have come to be cognizant of another 
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kind of fidelity, which makes obsolete the debate between fidelity 
and license in the conventional sense:  “Sie besteht darin, diejenige 
Intention auf die Sprache, in die übersetzt wird, zu finden, von 
der aus in ihr das Echo des Originals erweckt wird” [The task 
of the translator consists in finding that intended effect upon 
the language into which he is translating in it the echo of the 
original].18  In short, the true “fidelity” of translation is directed 
toward the “intended effect” or essence of the original.
 In the absence of the original to be redeemed, H.D.'s Fragment 
113 creates the original and remains faithful to it.  For H.D., 
translation is “the basic formulation of her writing practice”;19 
writing a poem of her own and translating a poem of someone 
else are, somehow, parts of the same enterprise.  There is, in other 
words, in H.D.'s translations a sense of loyalty or adherence to that 
which begs to be created—faithfulness to a kind of Benjaminian 
“essence” or “universal language” that, in his vision, all translations 
should participate as a part of.  Mysticism is no doubt a part of 
Benjamin's view of translation, and the same appears to apply to 
H.D., who articulates her own vision of the “task of the translator” 
in her novel, Bid Me to Live:
She brooded over each word, as if to hatch it.  Then she 
tried to forget each word, for “translations” enough existed 
and she was no scholar.  She did not want to “know” Greek 
in that sense.  She was like one blind, reading the texture 
of incised letters, rejoicing like one blind who knows an 
inner light, a reality that the outer eye cannot grasp….
 Anyone can translate the meaning of the word.  She 
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wanted the shape, the feel of it, the character of it, as if it 
had been freshly minted.20
The explicit message of the passage is the rejection of word-for-
word translation; thinly masked as a feminine bashfulness that is 
characteristic of the modernist period—“she was no scholar”—H.D.'s 
portrayal of “translations” in quotation marks is dismissive enough, 
since, after all, anyone “can translate the meaning of the word.” 
In place of the conventional, faithful word-for-word approach, the 
image of translation as an act of creation abounds in this excerpt; 
although the first reptilian image of birthing—“hatch”—ends in a 
redoing and she would try “to forget” those words that are hatched 
out of her brooding, H.D. appears to find an expression she looks 
for in the second image of creation, of minting something “freshly”: 
a creation of something new, with an echo of the modernist slogan, 
“make it new.”  Minting, however, is a peculiar kind of creation; 
the process of creating a new “freshly minted” material involves, 
especially in the manufacture of monetary coins, a presence of its 
source or essence, such as a stamp or a frame.  The relationship 
between the stamp and a coin in minting is similar to Plato's 
idea and form:  an existence of a hidden, unmentioned model 
becomes the source of all created forms.  This theme of a hidden 
or incommunicable model that exists outside of our immediate ken 
manifests itself in the persistent image of blindness, to which H.D. 
calls attention by repeating the phrase “one blind”—something 
inaccessible by “outer eyes” and only available to those who 
possess the “inner light.”
 If we compare H.D.'s description of the activity of a translator 
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with that of Benjamin's task of the translator, many of the same 
themes adumbrate themselves:
In all languages and their creations there remains, 
beyond the communicable, something incommunicable, 
something symbolizing or symbolized, according to 
context.  Symbolizing only, in the ultimate creations of the 
languages; symbolized, in the evolutions of the languages 
themselves.  And what seeks to come forward, indeed to 
come to birth, in the evolution of the languages is the germ 
of universal language.  But if this germ, though hidden 
and fragmentary, is nonetheless present in actual life as 
that which is symbolized, it exists in works of art only 
in the form of its symbolic representation.  If the final 
essence, which is universal language itself, is in individual 
languages confined to the linguistic and its transformations, 
then in works of art it suffers from the burden of an alien 
sense.  To free it… is the unique power of translation.21
The images similar to those of the H.D. passage are imminently 
visible in the Benjamin passage:  the ubiquitous birth image; the 
image of a larger essence, or the source of all things, described 
as the “germ of universal language”; the image of something 
beyond the communicable, beyond the reach of one's cognition or 
awareness.  Particularly H.D.-esque in the passage is the distillation 
of the plural “languages” into a singular “germ” of “universal 
language.”  That the translators omit any article in front of “universal 
language” signifies that they interpret the intended effect of 
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the phrase “universal language” as something that embodies 
conceptuality, as opposed to particularity:  like the stamp in 
minting, or the Platonic “idea.”  The dialectical syntheses between 
individuals and the collective, between the plurals and the singular 
core, suggest, on one hand, a drive toward minimalism—a current 
of modernist aesthetics of which H.D. was a prominent part—
and, on the other hand, the multiplicity or heterogeneity within 
the singular.  This sense of an “alien” other is what Benjamin 
expounds on in the last two sentences of this passage; “universal 
language” manifests itself in individual languages as a kind of 
foreign other, for it contains within it the elements that are not 
native in that particular language.  The task of translation is to 
give this vague foreignness a clarity and coherence that unburden 
the language, thereby bringing it closer toward the essence that is 
“universal language.”
 This presence of the foreign other within the thing that is 
supposed to be a unified self becomes the main theme and crisis of 
Fragment 36.  Like Fragment 113, Sappho's fragment 36 is another 
piece that survived in quotes, by the Stoic philosopher Chrysippus; 
all that remains of the original is the line, “I know not what to do; 
my mind is divided.”  In H.D.'s rendition of the poem, the line from 
the original becomes the refrain at the beginning of each stanza, 
highlighting the sense of bewilderment and self-split that paralyzes 
the speaker:
  I know not what to do,
  my mind is reft:
  is song's gift best?
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  is love's gift loveliest?
  I know not what to do,
  now sleep has pressed
  weight on your eyelids…22　　　　　　　　　　　(1-7)
The situation described in the poem is straightforward enough; 
gazing at the beloved who sleeps beside her, the speaker debates 
with herself whether to pursue the beloved or stop.  The internal 
debate stems from the self-split:  there is a self that wants one thing, 
and there is the other self that wants something else.  There is, 
however, a further split: namely, the self that observes and speaks 
of the self-split, otherwise known as a state of dedoublement.23  In 
other words, the lyric speaker's utterance about herself reveals the 
seed of self-fragmentation, sowed in the enlightenment definition 
of the modern subject as a self-defining agent; when the self has 
the agency to define itself, the self becomes divided into the self 
that creates and the self that is created.   In this manner, the 
subject becomes both a subject and an object, simultaneously self 
and other:24  a native self and a foreign self that the native self 
recognizes as alien.
 This sense of an unrecognized self, or a self outside of the 
control of the self, is captured by the word choice, “reft,” which 
replaces the word “divided” in the Wharton edition.  The word 
“reft” carries a stronger connotation of the forcible nature of 
the act and a keen awareness that there is an active agent who 
has taken that action; whereas the word “divided” is imminently 
compatible, and even comfortable, with a passive tense and a 
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lack of the agent who effects the act—that is, when reading the 
line “my mind is divided,” not many of us would wonder who is 
dividing the speaker's mind—the word “reft” forces us to look for 
the agent of that action, and it is a highly uncomfortable word 
in a passive tense without the subject.  In other words, “reft” 
inevitably invokes a sense of some unknown force that controls 
the self.  This sense of the incontrollable is partly a love-lyric 
cliché; we have heard it so many times, in pop-music and love 
songs and the like, the phrases along the line of “I can't help but 
keep loving you” or “I feel so crazy” or “fly me to the moon and 
let me sing among the stars.”  Suffice it to say, it is rather quite 
astonishing that those seemingly unthinking teenagers and soap-
opera watchers and robotic financial analysts are daily exposed 
to the process of dedoublement and self-fragmentation, perhaps 
without knowing.  But more to the point, the poem foregrounds 
the sense of the alien other within the self through its rendition of 
the divided mind.
 The crisis of the poem's self-division occurs in stanza 7, when 
the poem goes into an allegorical wrestling match that portrays 
the mind in a divisive paralysis:
  My mind is quite divided,
  my minds hesitate,
  so perfect matched,
  I know not what to do:
  each strives with each
  as two white wrestlers 
  standing for a match,
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  ready to turn and clutch
  yet never shake muscle nor nerve nor tendon;
  so my mind waits
  to grapple with my mind,
  yet I lie quiet,
  I would seem at rest.26　　　　　　　　　　　　(40-52)
The speaker's singular “mind” turns into a plural “minds” in 
the first two lines of the stanza, following her proclamation that 
her mind is “divided”; with the addition of the word “quite,” the 
poem signals the height of tension in self-fragmentation.  The 
mystical wrestling match—the one that turns into a stalemate, for 
the two are “so perfect matched”—recalls the image of Jacob and 
his wrestling match with a mysterious figure, a stalemate, one 
in which he “wrestled a man with him until the breaking of the 
day" and from which Jacob pries out a blessing from the mystery 
figure;27 the poem hints at the speaker's feeling that, somehow, if 
this deadlock were resolved, she would move toward some type 
of blessing, some type of a desirable outcome.  Nevertheless, the 
speaker's mind “waits / to grapple,” hesitating to engage with 
itself.  In this scene, too, we see another layer of self-fragmentation: 
the self that wants to engage, and the self that hesitates; the self 
that foresees a blessing, and the self that, despite it, withdraws. 
The closing line of the stanza—“I would seem at rest”—is an irony, 
since, despite the appearance of rest and peacefulness, the mind, 
broken into multiple fragments, remains at war with itself.
 This sense of hesitation or avoidance mirrors H.D.'s practice 
in translation of Sappho.  Eileen Gregory notes “how scrupulously 
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H.D. avoids engagement with Sappho as a translator,” and asserts 
that H.D.'s attachment to the Wharton edition and its compendium 
of translations, despite the uncovering of Sappho manuscripts and 
publications of more complete editions, is a kind of avoidance in 
itself.28  On the Wharton edition, H.D. comments, “For myself I am 
superstitious.  I feel that in the gallery or galaxy of translations 
of Sappho that particular translation of Swinburne is forever and 
ever wedded to that particular fragment.”29  H.D.'s remark suggests 
that there is a certain otherworldly, “superstitious” force at work 
in her attachment to the obsolete, anthologist Wharton edition that 
contains fewer lines of the “original” but more of past translations 
in its compendium.  In fact, the reception of H.D.'s translation of 
Sappho as “expansion” or “refabrication” is strikingly similar to 
the charges thrown at Robert Lowell's Imitations, on which critics 
have variously commented as:  “Nobody… is going to take this 
as straight translation”;30 “These were no ordinary translations 
but poems that just happened to closely resemble the originals”;31 
or “many reviewers and critics have regarded Imitations as a 
collection of more or less free translations.”32  In a way, just as 
Lowell attempts to come to terms with the condition of linguistic 
alienation and displacement in Imitations by being “almost as free 
as the authors themselves in finding ways to make them ring right 
for” him33 and by avoiding the shackles of word-for-word or sense-
for-sense notions of fidelity, H.D. prefers to work from a condition 
of privation of the original, in which the original is pared down to 
its bare essence and in which Sappho becomes more spectral and 
mediated than living and immediate.
 H.D.'s preference for privation stems from her keen awareness 
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of the lost-ness of the original; there is a sense of stoic abstinence 
about avoiding an enticing, tantalizing illusion of presence, as 
exemplified by her translation of Fragment 40.  H.D.'s Fragment 40, 
a poem about the bitter-sweet nature of love, states:
  Keep love and he mocks,
  ah, bitter and sweet,
  your sweetness is more cruel
  than your hurt.34　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　(9-12)
The sentiment here is one of classic lovesickness:  the kind of “he 
won't stay with me anyway so the false hope of sweetness is more 
cruel in the end” feeling.  Hope, in a sense, becomes a spice that 
intensifies the taste of despair.  To put it bluntly, the poem risks 
becoming a cliché; for that matter, any love poem can potentially 
be a cliché, but especially when words like “bitter-sweet” are used 
to describe “love” in a poem, it is hard to escape banality, no 
matter how best the writer tries to redeem the poem.  Fragment 
40 may not be one of H.D.'s stronger poems, but it does explain 
a sentiment that underlies her avoidance of straight translation, 
as well as her general sense of withdrawal and forbearance:  in 
the face of a totalizing absence, the false or illusory hope for a 
presence is more hurtful than comforting.
 This aspect of H.D.'s translation practice—the premise that the 
original is absent, and that its loss must be created in an effort 
to give a spectral birth into this realm of privation—foregrounds 
itself further in Fragment 68.  In perhaps the most dramatic ellipsis 
of all fragments, H.D. reduces the entire Sappho fragment into one 
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line of epigraph.  The Sappho fragment reads as follows in a prose 
translation:
But thou shalt ever lie dead, nor shall there be any 
remembrance of thee then or thereafter, for thou hast not 
of the roses of Pieria; but thou shalt wander obscure even 
in the house of Hades, flitting among the shadowy dead.35
H.D. distills the whole of the Sappho fragment into just six words 
by using an ellipsis:  “… even in the house of Hades.”  H.D. then 
expands the epigraph into a three-page poem, which has largely 
been interpreted as an expression of death wish; having already 
been slain both by love and by a rejection of her love, the speaker 
tells her soldier-lover how she envies him for his chance of death, 
for she herself would welcome her actual death.36  Critics have 
commented on the poem as “uncharacteristic of Sappho” because 
Sappho would never embrace death,37 but before branding the 
poem as a licentious fabrication, we may benefit from a closer 
examination of what “death” means in the poem.  The poem 
consists of three parts:  the first section narrates the speaker's 
willingness to embrace death despite what it will bring to her; in 
the second section, the poet-speaker muses what death can bring 
to her that has not been brought about already; and in the third 
section, the speaker apparently speaks from the house of Hades, 
having been slain by the goddess.  The “death” the poet-speaker 
envies seems to differ from her present condition of “death.”  In 
the first section, H.D. writes:
－ 56 －
  I envy you your chance of death,
  how I envy you this.
  I am more covetous of him
  even than of your glance,
  I wish more from his presence
  though he torture me in a grasp,
  terrible, intense.
  Though he clasp me in an embrace
  that is set against my will
  and rack me with his measure,
  effortless yet full of strength,
  and slay me
  in that most horrible contest,
  still, how I envy you your chance.
  Though he pierce me—imperious—
  iron—fever—dust—
  though beauty is slain
  when I perish,
  I envy you death.
  What is beauty to me?
  has she not slain me enough,
  have I not cried in agony of love,
  birth, hate,
  in pride crushed?
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  What is left after this?
  what can death loose in me
  after your embrace?
  your touch,
  your limbs are more terrible
  to do me hurt.
  What can death mar in me
  that you have not?38　　　　　　　　　　　　　(I.1-32)
The first three stanzas narrate the tortuous nature of death, 
sandwiched by the speaker's desire for death in spite of it:  the 
classical images of torture abound, including clasping, rack, slaying, 
piercing, and other acts that mar her beauty.  The organizing 
principle of this free verse is, aside from anaphora, the irregular 
but strategic placement of off-rhymes.  The anaphora keeps 
placing the same words at line ends, such as “death” or “me,” to 
create rhyming effects, and in addition to producing sound-echoes 
throughout, the off-rhymes link several words and their ideas to 
create a kind of imagistic syncopation.  For instance, in stanza 4, 
the words “love” and “enough” are linked by the off-rhyme, which 
carries across the sense of “enough”-ness—a sense of plentitude, 
exhaustion, and weariness—from the suffering of being slain in line 
21 to the act of crying in agony of love in line 22; even though the 
word “enough” modifies “slain” and not “cried,” we feel as though 
the speaker is saying that she has cried in agony enough, on top 
of being slain enough.  In other words, through the off-rhyme, the 
two actions merge into one, like the piano sounds blurring into 
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one another through the use of the syncopation pedal.
 Likewise, there is another set of words that a rhyme 
interconnects:  “presence” and “intense.”  The intensity of the 
torture and the intensity of presence blur into one another, as 
though to say:  death endows the speaker with a presence she 
covets, in the process of torture—death enables the speaker to exist, 
even if only as an object of torture.  Although death is commonly 
seen as something that causes a loss, the idea of death as a proof 
of life is not so counter-intuitive; as a transitive verb, the word 
“torture” presupposes the presence of an object, and, furthermore, 
we know from countless reports of wartime journalism that 
torturers tend to hold onto evidence of their torture, allowing 
the tortured to exist if only as objects of torture—such as in the 
Nazis's meticulous documentation of their atrocities against the 
Jews, which, ironically, was used against the Nazis as evidence for 
their crime against humanity in Nuremberg, or in the infamous 
picnic-photos of the Abu Ghuraib, which, ironically, had practically 
no meaningful consequences.  But Nazis and Abu Ghuraib aside, 
the speaker's wish for “death” appears rooted in her desire for 
“presence”—her desire to exist.  Her attachment to presence, along 
with her fear of losing her existence, is mirrored in her question 
in stanza 5:  “What is left after this?”  Death creates a loss, 
which becomes a signification for privation; even if its object of 
signification has been lost, the word “loss” becomes a sign or trace 
of existence, a kind of commemoration in a sense, for something 
that has completely been erased out of sight would not be felt as a 
“loss.”
 This preference for a “loss” that creates the self over the 
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“absence” of the self becomes precisely the reason for the speaker 
to envy the addressee for his “chance of death,” in spite of all the 
suffering associated with it.  The speaker's desire for presence is 
intensified in section 3:
  So the goddess has slain me
  for your chance smile
  and my scarf unfolding
  as you stooped into it;
  so she trapped me
  with the upward sweep of your arm
  as you lifted the veil,
  and the swift smile and selfless.
  Could I have known?
  nay, spare pity,
  though I break,
  crushed under the goddess' hate,
  though I fall beaten at last,
  so high have I thrust my glance
  up into her presence.
  
  Do not pity me, spare that,
  but how I envy you
  your chance of death.39　　　　　　　　　　　(III. 1-18)
The speaker tells us that an unidentified “goddess” has slain her, 
and we infer that the speaker is the one who is speaking from the 
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“house of Hades.”  Whether or not the speaker is metaphorically 
or actually dead is hard to tell, but in the first stanza, the line 
that stands out for its prosodic peculiarity is the last line:  “and 
the swift smile and selfless.”  With its alliteration and three strong 
stresses on alliterated words, in a stanza in which most of the 
other lines receive two or fewer strong stresses, the line presents 
itself as the height of tension in the poem:  the fear of becoming 
“selfless” in death.
 Because of this fear, the second stanza expressly resists the 
loss of self.  In her description of the goddess' slaying of the 
speaker, H.D. insistently uses the word “I” as the subject of the 
sentences, whereas the “I” speaker is in fact the object of those 
actions.  When “I break,” the reality is that the goddess is making 
the speaker break; and when “I fall beaten,” it is the goddess who 
beats her and causes her downfall.  This subject-object inversion 
suggests an urgent impulse to reclaim agency, to reclaim a subject 
position and to regain the ability to stave off disappearance. 
For instance, if H.D. had phrased the line “I fall beaten” as “the 
goddess keeps beating” and omit the object “me,” it still passes 
as perfectly fluent English that would communicate meaningfully 
and convey, for a close reader, a desire to repress the speaker's 
victimhood or reticence about her victim status; it would be a 
way to escape from the goddess' aggression through disappearance 
of the self.  But by turning the “I” into the subject and refusing 
to effect the disappearance of the self, the speaker asserts the 
presence of the self.  In fact, the only active action in the stanza—
“I thrust my glance”—looks toward precisely what she desires: 
“presence.”  Even in the house of Hades, what the speaker wishes 
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to forestall is the prospect of total self-erasure; death becomes 
desirable only if it serves as a commemoration—if it becomes a 
loss that signifies the lost object.
 There are, in other words, several layers to the notion of 
“death” in this poem, aside from the actual, physical, biological, 
medical death that is the loss of life:  first, a figurative death, as in 
line 21 of section 1 when the speaker claims to have been “slain” 
by beauty; secondly, a signifying death, which is a physical or 
figurative loss of life whereby death becomes a sign or proof of 
past existence, as in the refrain of “I envy you your chance of 
death”; and lastly, a totalizing absence, an erasure, of which the 
Sappho original speaks in the line, “thou shalt wander obscure 
even in the house of Hades, flitting among the shadowy dead.” 
It is the third type of death that the speaker fears—a complete 
erasure of existence, a fate that was handed to Erostratus after 
he burned the temple of Ephesus in an attempt to make his 
name immortal—and it is the second type of death that the 
speaker yearns for.  The speaker desires the second type of death 
because she believes that it cannot be any more hurtful than the 
predicament she finds herself in her relationship to the addressee, 
which is the first type of death:  a metaphorical state of death, 
in which she might as well be dead to the addressee because the 
addressee would not care for her and his life would go on as 
though she does not exist at all.
 In a sense, what H.D. attempts to create in her translation of 
Sappho is the second death:  a creation of a state of “loss” that 
would signify, by referencing privation, the presence of a trace 
of existence.  The effect of H.D.'s translation of Sappho through 
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ellipsis and expansion is to bring about the second type of death in 
an attempt to stave off the third type of death.  H.D. acknowledges 
that “Sappho has become for us a name, an abstraction as well as 
a pseudonym for poignant human feeling.”40  Sappho has, in other 
words, become for us an item of signification, an emptied signifier 
or a convenient stand-in for something else; the “real” or “authentic” 
Sappho, whatever “real” or “authentic” means, does not exist for 
us, and if not for the chain of quotations and translations, Sappho 
would have suffered the third type of death, left unbeknown to us 
without a trace of “loss.”  The task of the translator, then, is to 
enact the second type of death—to create a state of loss—in order 
to bring into being, by extension, the life that had previously not 
existed.
 Sappho may be a case of extremity in that much of her “original” 
is literally lost to us, and any translation of her must start 
from its inscription of that loss.  Nonetheless, this conception of 
translation as a creation of loss that creates the past life applies to 
all practices of translation, merely to a varying degree; sometimes, 
the “loss” we speak of is a literal loss like that of Sappho's 
fragments, but at other times, it could refer to metaphorical losses, 
such as a phenomenological loss of the Husserlian ilk, or Erich 
Auerbach's “if I don't remember it, it doesn't exist” brand of 
loss, or, more commonly, the metaphorical “loss” of the mythical 
“original” in the translation practice.  However counterintuitive 
it may seem, translation exists before the original as much as the 
original precedes translation; that is, much in the same way that, 
in the words of Wordsworth, the child is the father or mother of 
the adult,41 translation is the father or mother of the original.  It 
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is through this reversibility of ascendancy that the translation 
comes to assume the Benjaminian “kinship” with the original—
kinship, that is, with its full connotation of the lack of inequality 
among its members, unlike master-slave relationships or father-
son relationships or other relationships in which one party's 
ascendancy over the other is a built-in assumption.  As Jonathan 
Abel asserts, translations “do share something with the translated, 
but this sharing is not the communicating of one text's message 
to another, the erasing of one by another, the domineering of one 
over another, or the embellishment of one text at the expense of 
the other”:  the sharing is the “being-in-common, the standing-in-
relation between two texts.”42  On one end of the relationship, a 
translation may signify something “lost” from the original, but on 
the other end of the relationship, a translation creates this “loss” 
that creates the original.
 The original and translation come to stand on equal grounds 
because of this reversibility of ascendancy that H.D.'s translation 
of Sappho's fragments reveals through her distillation-expansion 
practice.  But such revelation would not come about if not for our 
awareness of the state of absence and the subsequent creation of 
loss that the translation starts with; in a sense, it is a dialectic of 
hide-and-seek, what James Longenbach calls the co-existence of “the 
urgent need to communicate and the still more urgent need not to 
be found” that is at the heart of the process of poetic articulation.43 
H.D.'s translation of the Sappho fragments illuminates for us that 
this process of creation takes us through the occluded “foreign 
other” in the original that the Benjaminian “universal language” 
manifests itself as, through hesitance and silence that our 
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encounter with this “foreign other” induces in us, before reaching 
its destination and becoming available as a finished product 
of translation; in a psychoanalytic language, it is a process of 
transference, projection and introjection, the casting the self to the 
other and casting inside of the other, which are simultaneously 
both an act of interpretation and an act of self-discovery, a kind of 
decoding of the “hieroglyph of the unconscious.”44  If this portrayal 
of translation seems mythical or mystical, it likely means that it 
is; however hazy or wobbly our understanding of translation is, 
we continue to translate because it is the one way we know how 
to stave off the third type of death, the definitive absence that 
does not leave even a trace or hint of loss.  What H.D.'s translation 
reminds us is that translations create a fictive narrative of loss as 
a way of bringing the original into existence, and that this forgery 
of loss is imminently more preferable to utter nothingness.
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